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1  Introduction
This article is not strictly scientific. It is a story, 
simplified in details, because a full version would 
need several book volumes. It is not based on any 
theory, nor does it elaborate systematically existing 
sources. Some information is approximate, ethnic 
and military data in particular, simply because 
available sources diverge from each other. Ques-
tions such as land ownership, taxes and legal sys-
tems are quite complicated and can be discussed 
only superficially. Correct place names exist in 
Finnish, Swedish, Russian, and German. The most 
common variant of the time is selected. Referenc-
es within the text have been omitted. Without this 
choice, the length would have doubled. Now it out-
lines the mutual relations between Finns and Rus-
sians over several centuries. This length-of-time 
perspective is necessary because political argumen-
tation may go that far back in time. The latest 300 
years have been dominated by a megacity but the 
elements for its existence go back for at least 800 
years. The city is Sankt Petersburg, founded in 1703 
to be Russiaʼs commercial outlet and political cen-
ter. Its population reached that of Finland in about 
1990 where after growth continued beyond the city 
limit. The need for a defense zone led to Careliaʼs 
and then Finlandʼs integration into the empire, 
following the sophistication of weapon technology. 
This link also exists today. It is in no way unique. 
Istanbul in relation to Bulgaria, Vienna to Slova-
kia, Copenhagen to Sweden, Buenos Aires to Uru-
guay, and Vientiane to Thailand feature the same 
situation although not necessarily the same urgen-
cy. To a casual observer, Finlandʼs case often looks 
enigmatic. Finlandʼs UN ambassador M. Jacobson 
recalled this comment from President J.F. Kennedy 
in 1961: “We Americans are particularly interest-
ed in why the Soviet Union has allowed Finland to 
keep independence in the extent as has happened.” 
The question disclosed the outsider way of think-
ing, based on power politics: small nations exist 
only because of the benevolence of Great Powers. 
Jacobson explained, and we will explain, too, al-
though in more detail than he had the opportunity 
to provide. The words of a Petersburg museum di-
rector are equally revealing: “You Finns have got 
everything from us – nationality, independence and 
language.” Well, somethings have we got but then 
we developed it further ourselves.
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“At least by us it’s one man from each house to meet the enemy.”
(Akhromeyev, C-in-C of the Red Army during a visit in Finland, 1989)
“... and by us it is two if the house is large.” (Old Finnish quip)
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2  Early history
The Finnic (or Ugric) linguistic area covered 
northern Russia, mostly west of the Ural Moun-
tains, down to the Kazan–Moscow line. The west-
ern border went approximately up to Valdaiʼs wa-
tershed area. These ancient roots became political 
currency at the turn of twentieth century when 
nationalistic ideas became popular – although 
only Finnish and Carelian are mutually intel-
ligible. The genetic picture is totally different. 
Modern Finns are very similar to their neighbors 
around the northern Baltic. The linguistic bound-
ary started moving north from the year 500 when 
Slavs emerged from the Pripet marshes. Four-hun-
dred years later they were at Lake Ilmen and the 
Moskva–Oka River watershed. They were tall and 
blond farmers of Christian faith. The aborigine 
Chudy were short, of dark complexion, hunters 
and fishers worshipping nature. When farmers in-
filtrated the best lands, the Chudy withdrew or in-
termarried rather than put up armed resistance. 
Some 10 percent of the Russian genetic stock is 
thought to be of Chud origin, visible also in the 
national character. Villages grew to cities, among 
them Novgorod at Ilmen Lake, founded in 913 by 
a Swedish chieftain, Rurik, who followed the an-
cient trade route by the Neva and Volhov Rivers. 
The Gulf of Finland received its coastal Swedish 
population in these times. Novgorod organized the 
fur trade of northern Chudy who could participate 
in the cityʼs democratic government, in sharp con-
trast to the knightly dynasties elsewhere.
Swedenʼs center was moving north to its cur-
rent location at Stockholm and expanded toward 
Finland. Novgorod in the south had the same am-
bition with three centuries of wars as a result. The 
antagonists christianized the population, Roman 
Catholic (subsequently Lutheran) and Ortho-
dox faith respectively. The decisive phase came 
in 1240–1 when Novgorodians defeated Swedish 
and German armies at the Neva River and Peipus 
Lake, respectively. At Neva, victory came with the 
assistance of the local Izhory, a Finnic tribe. Af-
ter the battle, their chief, Pelgois, was given the 
task of “keeping an eye on the sea”. The Swedes 
blocked the land route to the west with a castle 
at Viipuri in 1293. Peace was made in Nöteborg 
in 1323 (Fig. 1). The border started at the Siestar 
River, close to the Neva estuary and went NNW 
through the Carelian Isthmus and then to the 
Bothnian coast, splitting Carelians, a Finnish 
tribe, into two hostile camps. It left to Novgorod 
the trade routes along the Neva and the Oulu Riv-
ers, blocked Swedish access to Lake Ladoga but 
allowed Novgorod access to the northern Saimaa 
Lake district. When Moscow had shed the Mongol 
dominance, it conquered Novgorod three times, 
weakening its ability to resist Finnish settlement. 
The Olavinlinna castle blocked Carelian access to 
Saimaa fishing waters from 1475 and the border 
was transferred a good leap eastward.
Figure 1 Finlandʼs borders, 1323–1617.
Source: Toivo, Raisa Maria, 2007. Suomen alue Ruotsin 
ajalla. In: Haapala, Pertti ja Raisa Maria Toivo (toim.), 
Suomen historian kartasto , 86–7 ja 94–5. Karttakeskus: 
Helsinki.
5FINLAND IN THE SHADOW AND SHINE 
Figure 2 Finlandʼs borders, 1617-1809.
Source: Toivo, Raisa Maria, 2007. Suomen alue Ruotsin 
ajalla ja  Vähäväkinen maa – Ruotsin-ajan väestönkehitys. 
In: Haapala, Pertti, ja Raisa Maria Toivo (toim.), Suomen 
historian kartasto , 86-7 ja 94-5. Karttakeskus: Helsinki.
Sweden then escaped the medieval Danish dom-
inance and got competent rulers in the Vasa fami-
ly. These organized administration, state finances, 
the army and navy along modern principles, and 
created a metallurgical industry. The excellence 
was put to use in wars against Denmark, Rus-
sia, Poland, and the German Emperor. Swedish 
troops even occupied Moscow for some months and 
Novgorod for years. The reward was meted out in 
Stolbova in 1617, comprising the Novgorod half 
of Carelia and all Ingria, land south of the Neva 
River (Fig. 2). These were not integrated with the 
country proper but were considered colonies. En-
try to the Neva from Ladoga was blocked by the 
Nöteborg castle. Sweden felt safe in the east and 
turned its attention toward the south. Large ar-
eas of Danish, Polish, and German Baltic coasts 
were won. The Danish provinces were ethnically 
related and easily assimilated. Their tax income 
constituted 25 percent of the total compared to 
Finlandʼs 10 percent, and led to a refocus in for-
eign and defense policies. Southern engagement 
invited the Russians to attack in 1656. Orthodox 
Carelians joined the invaders, and when these 
retreated, Carelians emigrated to their brethren 
in Olonets and to Tver province, 100 km NW of 
Moscow. Tver Carelians preserved ethnic identity 
up to the 1930s and counted some 150,000 people. 
Finns believe that A.V. Suvorov, the general who 
never lost a battle and spoke fluent Carelian, was 
one of them. Perhaps he was born from a mixed 
marriage with a Carelian mother. The Orthodox 
population was replaced by Lutheran immigrants 
who soon considered themselves as rightful own-
ers of the land.
3  Russia takes over
Sweden had antagonized all its Baltic neigh-
bors, who were waiting for an opportunity to settle 
scores. It came in 1700 when a disastrous famine 
had decimated one-third of the countryʼs popula-
tion and a 19-year youngster became Swedenʼs 
autocrat King Carl XII. It seemed unlikely that he 
could cope with four simultaneous aggressors. He 
did, but could not be everywhere simultaneous-
ly. During his absence, Russiaʼs equally capable 
czar Peter I founded at Neva estuary a new town, 
Sankt Petersburg, in 1703, “to open a window to-
wards Europe.” He created a metallurgical base 
in Petrozavodsk at Lake Onega and shipped guns 
cast there along the Svir to Ladoga. Swedes had 
nothing to put against their large caliber and long 
range. Petersburgʼs location has puzzled people. 
It should not. Petersburg on the Nevaʼs southern 
shore only replaced a Swedish town on the north-
ern side. The marshy ground was overcome by 
Dutch construction techniques. There have been 
serious floods in 1777, 1824, and 1924, but today 
a solid dam protects the city. Farther from the 
shore, ground is sand and gravel, land is above 
flood level, and the site as a whole is quite accept-
able. Riga, the alternative, with a shorter winter 
and still closer to Europe, had been part of Poland 
until 1621 and was now on the very border. Poland 
was a Great Power whose inner weakness became 
apparent only 50 years later. The new town, the 
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capital as from 1712, needed a security zone and 
Viipuri was duly conquered in 1710. Now Peter 
was ready for peace, but Carl was not. The inva-
sion therefore continued, plague broke out, and 
Finland was either occupied or destroyed. Coastal 
raids around Stockholm finally broke the resis-
tance. Peace was made in 1721 at Uusikaupunki. 
Peter was so anxious to get the deal done that he 
was prepared to let the Swedes keep Viipuri, but 
his generals delayed the critical message, which 
arrived too late. The new border coincided with 
the current one (Fig. 2). One-third of Finlandʼs 
population had survived. Tver Carelians might 
have been given the option to return to their old 
habitation were it not for the fact that their new 
masters had then lost valuable labor.
During the war, Peter had laid the administrative 
foundation of his new territories. Ingria became a 
Russian province whereas Swedish administration 
and practices were left largely intact in Carelia. 
Religion and laws from the Middle Ages were main-
tained. The clergy was educated in Swedish Finland 
and delivered sermons in Finnish and Swedish. Ad-
ministrators were initially imported from Balticum 
and used German and Swedish in parallel. Peasants 
could litigate with their landlord about taxes, this 
could not to punish them without legal trial, nor 
prevent them from moving or following another oc-
cupation. Ingrian serfs did not enjoy this protection 
(nor Danish, Polish, and German ones east of the 
Elbe River either). The hook was that all land be-
longed basically to the state and the Emperor (as 
the Czar was now called) could grant its tax income 
as salary. Emperors freely used this possibility all 
through the eighteenth century until one half of 
arable land had been so donated. Landlords could 
sell or pledge the donation but not its inhabitants, 
nor could they raise taxes without the governmentʼs 
consent. Taxes were defined as farm products or 
workdays, payable where the landlord wished, often 
in Petersburg. When disputes intensified, the Em-
peror decreed in 1826 that landlords were owners 
of land but not of its inhabitants. It was a massive 
property transfer, first from peasants to state and 
then to gentry.
Sweden built the Sveaborg naval base at Hel-
sinki and tried to recover lost territory in 1741–3 
and 1788–90 but failed and lost additional terri-
tory east of the Kymi River and south of Olavin-
linna, which was integrated with Carelia (Fig. 2). 
The loyalty of Finnish gentry and even its army 
began to crack. Only peasants remained faithful, 
cognizant of the lot of their like in Russia. Ignored 
by the military establishment, they formed par-
tisan units and managed quite well. Their inde-
pendent thinking was a source of inspiration one 
hundred years later when independent Finland 
was creating its own army.
During the Revolutionary wars of 1789–1815, 
the Russians seized the opportunity and finished 
the job in 1808–9. Sveaborg capitulated without 
fight. The army fought but having exhausted its 
resources finally capitulated in northern Sweden. 
The Emperor Alexander I ordered his troops to 
behave well and made it known that civil order 
and laws would be maintained. For emphasis he 
arranged a formal occasion in Porvoo, February 
1809, at which the Estates could pay homage to 
him. About one-fourth of the gentry deputies at-
tended, one-third chose a simultaneous Parlia-
mentary gathering (riksdag) in Stockholm, and 
the rest abstained from both. Alexander repeated 
his earlier promises and solemnly declared that 
the Finnish people had from now on been raised 
to the rank of a nation. The representatives an-
swered by pledging full allegiance. Technically, 
they were traitors because no peace had yet been 
made. The ceremony was identical to those giv-
en a few years later in Curland (western Latvia) 
and Moldavia, and not too different from the one 
that Peter I had given in Riga in 1710 to Estoniaʼs 
and Livlandʼs Germanic gentry. The practice was 
called for by circumstances. Russia expanded so 
rapidly that administration simply lacked capac-
ity to follow up. In Finland it was the beginning 
of autonomy; elsewhere it led to consolidation of 
existing privileges. The official text was in Rus-
sian but the speech in French was translated into 
Swedish. Finland was now a Grand Duchy, a rank 
held also by some Russian provinces. Its real con-
tent would be decided in practice.
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4  Grand Duchy
4.1 Russian angle
The exact meaning of the Porvoo gathering 
has often been debated. Finland was no admin-
istrative unit but a colloquial concept for Swedish 
possessions beyond the Gulf of Bothnia. There-
fore, was the gathering really a riksdag or only 
a lantdag (provincial assembly)? Exact delim-
itation came in the Hamina peace treaty in the 
autumn: eight Finnish counties (län) plus the 
Finnish-speaking area between the Kemi and 
Tornio Rivers, still short of the language border 
at the Kalix River and the famous iron ore depos-
its. What did the French word nation (“placé au 
rang des nations”) actually mean, only the people 
or also the area where they lived? Much later it 
was questioned as to whether Finnish and Swed-
ish speakers were two different nations. Was the 
Declaration a personal commitment or did it also 
oblige successors? Which laws did the Declaration 
cover? Laws reflect changing social mores and 
some laws, the Constitution, are more permanent 
than others. But this concept was unacceptable 
for Russians because it deprived the autocrat his/
her absolute power. Russian terms were Basic and 
Root Laws. In practice, each new ruler gave his or 
her personal pledge and avoided the hated word. 
But, also, the Constitution was an imprecise term: 
did it comprise the unilateral declarations of 1772 
and 1789 by the Swedish king? These questions 
gained significance toward the end of the century. 
Perhaps Alexander only wanted to keep the audi-
ence happy. He was basically a very busy politi-
cian who could not afford the luxury of academic 
analysis.
Alexander wanted to emancipate serfs but could 
not act directly because their taxes were an essen-
tial part of officersʼ and administratorsʼ remuner-
ation. He had to proceed stepwise and one step 
was to transfer the Carelian province from Rus-
sia proper to the Grand Duchy at the end of 1812. 
From now on this part of Finland was called “Old” 
and the rest “New.” The transfer was heartily de-
tested by Russian nobility and some leading Finns 
questioned its wisdom. At the grass roots, similar 
voices could be heard if one cared to listen:
Nikolai Iʼs Finnish coachman, ostensibly Ortho-
dox, reportedly complained to the Emperor about 
the difficulty to readapt oneself to the Swedish 
habits once one had got used to the Russian way. 
Why not let matters rest as they were? He really 
opened my eyes, commented the Emperor later on.
Ethnically, the move was appropriate although 
Ingria, still half Finnish speaking, was not includ-
ed. With time, “Old” laws and habits were stream-
lined after “New.” Only the relation between 
landlord and peasant in Old Finland remained. 
Landlords were inclined to raise taxes although 
these were regulated by law and had to be agreed 
with the tiller. Since peasants were not serfs, they 
were free to make money outside the farmstead 
without landlordʼs consent.
Landlords and, later, industrialists established 
sawmills, stone and marble quarries, ore mines, 
potteries, glass factories, metallurgical plants, 
shipyards, etc. These needed hundreds of horse 
teams, barges, and sailing ships for transports. 
Peasants also saw the opportunities offered by Pi-
iteri (colloquial name), Viipuri, and other towns 
to purchase manufactures and sell farm products, 
willow bark (for tanneries), cobble stones (for 
streets and foundations), and firewood, depending 
on the wareʼs perishability, value per weight unit, 
and distance. Petersburgʼs trade area grew with 
improving traffic networks and soon covered the 
Saimaa Lake District. Gradually, farmer-traders 
were overtaken by specialists. Someone opened a 
roadside inn or offered lodging at the destination. 
Others took a city job. A widening information 
field changed peopleʼs thinking and mentality. 
They became habile, witty, and open-minded. They 
learned some Russian and adopted habits like 
drinking tea from a glass and baking “Carelian” 
pastry, as people in western Finland had adopted 
Swedish words and some of its habits, without be-
ing unpatriotic for that. But established people in 
the West got irritated: Carelians were talkative, 
not sturdy enough, and somehow unreliable.
The annexation raised at a stroke Finlandʼs 
population by 300,000 to over 1 million. Thereby 
it exceeded Petersburgʼs size until 1990. Peters-
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burg has grown mostly by immigration. In the 
early years, 40,000 serfs were brought there each 
year during the construction period. Subsequent-
ly, the voluntary migration field covered northern 
European Russia and expanded with time to Mos-
cow and beyond (Fig. 3). In Finland, it comprised 
the entire eastern half and the largest cities. The 
Finnish population share in Petersburg, however, 
never exceeded 3 percent.
Figure 3 Petersburgʼs migration field, late 1880s.
Legend: Black marker Moscow.
Sources: Engman, Max, 2003. St. Petersburg och Finland, 
migration och influens 1703-1917 . Finska Vetenskaps-So-
cieteten: Helsingfors, 165. Kaila, Toivo T., 1914. Euroopan 
Venäjän väestönsiirroista XIX. vuosisadan lopulla . Hel-
singin Yliopisto: Helsinki, Taulut II (Muutot) ja III (Syn-
tymäpaikka).
The first to arrive were captured soldiers and 
civilians but soon the city started to attract free 
migrants. Job opportunities were plentiful, wages 
exceeded agricultural income, were paid in cash, 
a change of job was possible at short notice, and 
ordinary people enjoyed unusual social freedom. 
Women became maids, nurses and, later on, tex-
tile workers; men became masons, carpenters, 
chimney sweepers, coachmen, goldsmiths (at 
Fabergé, for example) and, later on, metal work-
ers. Chimney sweepers came from a few adjacent 
villages, had a semi-monopoly, and were well paid 
because of their honesty with wealthy customers. 
When Bolsheviks started building up the secret 
police (Cheka), they were the choice agents be-
cause they knew the city thoroughly. Petersburg 
was the dominant textile town in the 1840s and 
the 1850s, and the largest engineering center as 
from the 1870s. Very young boys and girls were 
accepted into apprenticeships. There were some 
Finnish entrepreneurs, representatives of export-
ers, civil servants and, naturally, officers.
Ingria Finns were peasants and benefited from 
their closeness to a giant market. Horse-drawn 
sledges loaded with large milk cans is a standard 
motif in ethnographic descriptions. Butter, eggs, 
poultry, pork, and firewood were other staples (not 
potatoes, a German specialty). Ten percent of the 
cityʼs coachmen were Finns. An Easter ride in a 
light, Finnish  sledge was traditional – and well paid. 
Much of the population was bilingual but cognizant 
of both their ethnic roots and provincial peculiarity. 
Marriage with a partner from Finland was frowned 
upon. The liberation of serfs in 1861 unleashed the 
demand for formal schooling. Authorities promoted 
Russian schools which would have led to rapid as-
similation but villagers often opted for Finnish ones 
and, since they stood for the costs, they also got their 
way. A teacherʼs seminar was opened in 1863, only to 
be closed before World War I.
4.2 Finnish angle
The administrative groundwork was done in 
Finland. The country was a Grand Duchy but 
lacked upper administrative structure. After 
some experimentation, things settled down. The 
Emperor always made the final decision, usually 
having consulted with the Russian minister. Mat-
ters concerning Finland were introduced to the 
Emperor by a Finnish civil servant of ministerʼs 
rank (Ministerstatssekretär) with office and res-
idence a few blocks from the Winter Palace, the 
Emperorʼs residence. He had regular audiences, a 
privilege not available to most Russian ministers. 
He answered the Emperorʼs questions but was not 
allowed to argue his case. Russia was represented 
in Finland by the General Governor, a Russian cit-
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izen, who was also the military commander. These 
were appointed to border provinces and were the 
Emperorʼs personal representatives. The insti-
tution was gradually dismantled but existed in 
Finland until independence. Finlandʼs capital and 
university were soon moved from Turku to Hel-
sinki, to be closer to Petersburg. The university, 
established in 1640, was named after Alexander 
and was the third oldest (after Vilna and Tartu) in 
the Empire. It soon became habit that the Crown 
Prince was its Chancellor. These three, with Pe-
tersburg, Moscow, and Kazan, made up the group 
whose examinations were fully interchangeable.
The Emperor was the origin of all laws. Those 
concerning Finland had, in principle, to be accept-
ed by the Finnish government, called the Senate. 
It happened that this wished amendments or re-
fused acceptance. The Emperor had three choices: 
change the law and resubmit it, announce a Decree 
instead, or carry on undisturbed. Each variant was 
used and all went well until the legal profession in 
Russia developed a theory about all-country and 
other (local) laws. The quarrel was ready because it 
was difficult to find important questions that had a 
strictly local bearing. Estates convened initially at 
the Emperorʼs request and, from 1869, every fifth 
year, but only got the right to suggest new laws in 
1886. It all started in the enlightened mind of Al-
exander I and was continued during Alexander II. 
Helsinkiʼs main business street, named after the 
former, and the latterʼs statue on Helsinkiʼs parade 
square testify to Finnish feelings. The street plan 
and prestigious public buildings were designed by a 
German architect from Petersburg and largely paid 
for by the Emperor since the Grand Duchy lacked 
the necessary means. The ingredients of a modern 
state were there. This fact both astonished and 
irritated Russians when they started visiting the 
country in large numbers.
The first Russians were soldiers. Finland had 
been conquered to be a buffer against Sweden. 
The populationʼs sympathies have been won by a 
generous autonomy. It would have been logical to 
let the country take care of its own defense under 
Russian overlordship. That went too far. Alexan-
der I was very specific to a trusted friend: Swedes 
might attack and their kinsmen on the coast might 
join them. That had happened in the 1808–9 war 
and could happen again. During the Crimean war, 
1853–5, when a British–French navy burnt na-
val supplies in coastal cities and bombarded de-
fenses, students had agitated against Russia. It 
was very naive but authorities did not take any 
chances. Poland had been granted its own army 
in 1815 and this had mutinied in 1831. With time, 
attitudes softened and a 5,000-strong infantry – 
but no artillery – was agreed for a 10-year peri-
od in 1878. It was one-fourth of what the country 
could bear demographically. The Russian military, 
10,000–25,000 strong, was quartered in barracks 
along the coast and at traffic junctions. With it 
came Russian merchants who also soon gained 
rights to offer their wares in nearby towns. The 
captive market in garrisons offered a solid foun-
dation and, within some decades, Russians dom-
inated key sectors of the urban retail trade. Fin-
landʼs most popular beer, “Koff,” originates from 
one of them. Construction entrepreneurs arrived 
because Finnish labor lacked the skills needed 
for prestige construction. Some remained, became 
industrialists and established sugar factories, 
tanneries, shoe manufacturers, etc. Later on, Rus-
sians spearheaded advanced technical gimmicks 
such as cars and airplanes. They also sowed the 
seeds of the Jewish and Tatar communities. Some 
of todayʼs largest confectionary chains are owned 
by ethnic Jews. Tatars excel in the fur business.
Wealthy tourists came during Nicolas Iʼs reign. 
Visas for foreign travel were not given and Hel-
sinki became a substitute destination. Burghers 
rented rooms and guests patronized classy baths, 
restaurants, and concerts. Imatra Rapids on the 
Vuoksi River also became popular and catalyzed 
the hotel business. Mass tourism arrived with 
railroads. The railroad between Helsinki and St. 
Petersburg was opened in 1870 and, owned by the 
Finnish state, was a key factor. Its end station was 
in central Petersburg, a one-way trip to Viipuri 
lasted a few hours and to Helsinki one night. It 
took city dwellers to the sandy beaches of the Gulf 
of Finland. Moneyed people bought lots and built 
vacation homes, the less moneyed hired rooms at 
farmsteads. The Finnish state had started buying 
estates and splitting homesteads to their tillers. 
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But sandy soil and a small homestead could not 
support a family, while guests needed coaches, 
handymen, construction workers, gardeners, and 
maids. In World War I, the overall summer popu-
lation reached 100,000, compared to a year-round 
population of 30,000. At places the ratio was 40:1. 
A boundary separated this paradise from Peters-
burg. There were customs controls, the Finnish 
markka was a legal tender parallel to the rouble, 
and stamps were different. There was no guaran-
tee that a Russian could use his own tongue with 
administrators. It is easy to imagine the irrita-
tion of a VIP at this red tape. In our time the zone 
would have been declared a Special Administrative 
Region but creative thinking had not yet reached 
that far. Worst of all, terrorists had discovered that 
they could operate with relative impunity from 
Finnish territory. It was decided in 1911 that the 
two nearest municipalities would be transferred 
from Finland to Russia proper. World War I came 
in between and the decision was never implement-
ed. Stalin returned to the matter two decades later 
in completely different conditions. Farther west, at 
Kymi River estuary, the Imperial Family had its 
own hideout: Langinkoski (Fig. 1). It was built for 
Alexander III and his Danish spouse Dagmar.
The Emperor liked to watch salmon fishers, 
chopped fire wood and carried water. It was the 
base for trips by the Imperial yacht. He became 
worried at the sight of an outlying island where all 
trees had been cut: the practice should be forbid-
den, and was amazed when told that legislating 
such things would take years. There was nobody 
to meet them in Turku, not even a coach avail-
able (the yacht arrived too early), so the Empress 
and her sister walked two kilometers from port to 
town and had refreshments in a cafeteria. They 
were perfectly safe, among beloving subjects.
The three irritants – stamps, money, and customs 
duties – differed in importance. Own stamps were a 
useless demonstration and could well go. Swedish 
currency remained legal tender until 1835, to fa-
cilitate economic adaptation. Own money mattered 
because financial discipline in Russia was poor, due 
mainly to many wars. The Russian finance minister 
miraculously agreed and Alexander II finally con-
sented. In 1865, the markka was tied to the price 
of silver and in 1878 of gold, 20 years earlier than 
in Russia. The PR effect was naturally disastrous, 
and during World War I Finland was compelled to 
accept a seriously deteriorating rate of exchange. 
Custom controls were originally a Russian demand 
to contain Finnish competition. But times changed 
and with them the tradeʼs structure. The charges 
mattered much for state finances, were subject to 
constant negotiations as in our days, and industrial 
fortunes changed accordingly. At independence, the 
Finnish paper industry dominated Russian mar-
kets whereas Finland depended on Russian grain 
deliveries.
The vacation zone appeared a comparative trivi-
ality. Unfortunately it was not. The upper crust of 
the capital was well represented and started agi-
tating against Finlandʼs autonomy at large. Par-
ticularly irritating was that Russian citizens were 
discriminated against in Finland whereas Finnish 
citizens had a free field in Russia. Alaskaʼs last 
Russian Governor was a Finn; a Finnish general, 
the Emperorʼs personal friend, was appointed Bul-
gariaʼs prime minister in 1878 and another led an 
army at Sandepu in 1906. Some were war or navy 
ministers in Petersburg. By contrast, Russians 
needed permission to settle down permanently in 
Finland, could not demand services in their own 
tongue, nor could they become civil servants who, 
moreover, were better paid than in Russia. Finns, 
by contrast, were welcome to government jobs in 
Russia provided that they managed the language. 
Top military schools had quotas for them, linguistic 
skills were given a flexible interpretation, scholar-
ships for language studies were freely available. Fi-
nally, compulsory education in Russian at schools 
was decreed. To no avail. Stubborn Finns refused 
to learn. The few people who excelled in Russian 
had either grown up there or were businessmen. In 
1944, when the first government after the war was 
set up, both foreign ministers had this background; 
the one had started at the Guards but went over to 
business, the other was the son of a station master 
at the Finland Station in Petersburg. When argu-
mentation reached a crescendo, they shifted from 
Swedish to Russian.
Language also had another dimension. Should 
the countryʼs main language be Finnish or Swed-
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ish? Finns were the majority, making up 80 percent 
of the population in the mid-1880s, and Swedes the 
minority. Swedes were educated and had the better 
jobs. The university operated in Swedish. Foreign-
ers who settled in the country associated naturally 
with Swedes. Finns had the basic skills of reading 
and writing thanks to the educational policy of the 
Lutheran church since the mid-sixteenth century. 
But, if they wanted to continue, they had to change 
the language they spoke. Hardly anybody was 
satisfied with the situation, not even all Swedes. 
Russians might force a wedge between the two 
groups, associate themselves with Finns and mar-
ginalize the politically suspect Swedes. In a way 
this happened, Finnish should be usable on equal 
terms with Swedish from 1886; at independence, 
the numerical superiority of Finns in the educated 
classes was a fact. At the highest levels of society, 
the Swedish maintained their positions until World 
War II and continue to be the other national lan-
guage with 5–6 percent of speakers.
Railroads had a pronounced military dimen-
sion (Fig. 4). The first line between Hämeenlin-
na and Helsinki in 1862 connected an inland lake 
system with an export/import port and the next 
line branched from it to the winter port of Hanko. 
But the rest basically radiated from Petersburg to 
all directions. East–west lines were added to link 
these “fingers” into a proper net. To this structure 
came short lines on the Carelian isthmus to serve 
fortifications and offer direct connection to the 
main set. The gauge was naturally the same as 
in Russia and the standard of track, rail, bridges, 
and rolling stock was raised to meet military re-
quirements before World War I. Finns also fancied 
about a line from the northern Ladoga shore to 
Petrozavodsk and another one from Rovaniemi to 
the Arctic coast. Economically, both were white el-
ephants. The true reasons were nationalistic and 
the Russians stalled in both cases. The Petroza-
vodsk line was completed in 1940 by the Russians 
themselves; the second one was replaced by a 
gravel road. Both gained significance in the early 
1940s.
5  Toward independence
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the 
international atmosphere hardened: the kind of 
situation for which Finland had been conquered. 
Germany had been united and became Europeʼs 
dominant country. Nationalism was the song of 
the time. The Russian middle class started ques-
tioning the gentryʼs leading role. Workers had 
woken up and peasants realized that the ending 
of serfdom had not made them any wealthier. 
Administration tried to promote its own ideology 
centered on autocracy, Orthodoxy, and a Russian 
soul. Minorities should be integrated with Rus-
sians and administration put on an equal footing 
everywhere.
The Grand Duchy should become a standard 
province: own stamps were phased out, coastal pi-
lots integrated with the Russian service, customs 
officials adopted Russian uniforms, knowledge of 
Russian became obligatory in many branches of 
the administration, its education at schools was 
radically increased, courts had to apply laws en-
acted by Russian legislators, the secret police be-
came visible, recruits should be sent to the Rus-
sian army. It all happened during two decades and 
created much bitterness. The real meaning of the 
Porvoo lantdag became important. The Russian 
interpretation naturally prevailed. Their argu-
ment was undisputable: Finland had been inte-
grated into Russia and not the other way around. 
Recalcitrant civil servants were fired or expelled to 
Siberia. Replacements were unfamiliar with local 
conditions and lacked popular support. Opinion 
leaders were exiled or left the country voluntarily. 
The draft was boycotted and replaced temporarily 
by a financial contribution. Russia was no longer a 
benevolent protector but an alien occupant.
During the Russo-Japanese war (1904–6) there 
were disturbances in Helsinki. The General Gov-
ernor moved to a warship, wondering whether the 
rebellious city should be bombarded. A fighting 
organization, “Voima” (Power), had been created 
and the Japanese sent it a shipload of arms from 
Antwerp. When the police went on strike, “Order 
Guards” were organized by labor unions and stu-
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dent corporations. Political life took on features of 
a class struggle. V.I. Lenin returned from abroad 
and called Bolshevik leaders to a meeting in Tam-
pere. It was in Tampere that I.V. Stalin met Lenin 
for the first time. The Emperor promised changes 
but soon resorted to delaying tactics. General and 
equal voting rights at Finnish parliamentary (but 
not municipal) elections could not be withdrawn, 
however, and became a fact of life from 1906. This 
was in sharp contrast to the Russian Duma, where 
monied people dominated. Anticipating war with 
Germany, Russia started strengthening defenses 
in Finland, the northern flank of the Petersburg 
Military District. World War I affected Finland 
only indirectly before the Revolution. Troops num-
bered 100,000 but maintained discipline. Coastal 
defenses were strengthened at Helsinki where the 
Baltic Navy was also concentrated. Manual labor 
was hired from all over the country and subse-
quently became the local nucleus of Red Guards.
When news about the March 1917 Revolution 
arrived in Helsinki, troops mutinied and discipline 
collapsed. Continuing military misfortunes and 
aggravating shortage of foodstuffs released the Oc-
tober Revolution and Bolsheviks took over. Their 
first attempt had failed and Lenin was whisked 
by local Finns to the Isthmus where he kept hid-
ing until October. Having risen to power, he made 
peace with Germany and promised independence 
to Russiaʼs minority people at request, expecting 
that they would rejoin once Socialism had won. The 
promise about independence was not a clumsy “red 
herring” as often suggested but a principle accept-
ed already in 1903 at the second party congress in 
Figure 4  Main railroads in Finland and northern Russia, 1918-1938.
Legend:  Broken line = existing; solid line = planned.
Sources:  Juntunen, Alpo, 1997. Valta ja rautatiet.  Historiallisia tutkimuksia, Suomen 
Historiallinen Seura: Helsinki, 161 (Kartta 4). Polvinen, Tuomo, 1962. Die finnischen Eisenbahnen in den militärischen und 
politischen Plänen Russlands vor dem ersten Weltkrieg , 295 (Beilage IV).
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London. Lenin also promoted double citizenship for 
Russians and Finns but found no response. Its time 
came 80 years later but in a European context. Sta-
lin was sent to Finland in November to raise work-
ers but these hesitated. Finns had already declared 
independence and their Conservative prime minis-
ter arrived in Petersburg with a formal application. 
Stalin, in the capacity of Peopleʼs Commissar for 
Nationality Questions, presented the case to the 
Executive Committee. The decision was positive 
and unanimous.
Stalinʼs efforts bore fruit in January 1918 when 
the youth wing of the Socialist Party asked Lenin 
for arms. Two days later, the arms arrived and the 
revolt could start.
O.V. Kuusinen was the key force. When a refugee 
in the Soviet Union after the Civil War he founded 
the Communist Party of Finland, assisted Lenin 
and Stalin as an authority of Marxʼs theories, 
was prime minister in the intended Socialist 
Government of Finland in 1939, and sat later 
in the Presidium of the Central Committee, the 
highest post any Finn has ever reached in Russia.
By a trick of fate, White Guards went into action 
the same night. They had bases in southern Both-
nia and Carelia, and had opted for Germans who 
organized military training for a strengthened 
battalion. Its “graduates” constituted the cadres 
for training and battle who provided qualitative 
superiority, not to say staff officers, often Swedish 
volunteers, who were professionals.
The commander was lieutenant-general C.G. 
Mannerheim, a well established baron in the 
highest circles of Petersburg, married to a Russian 
lady and with 30 years of service in the Imperial 
army. He had participated in the Japanese war, 
made a 2-year reconnoitering ride in Chinese 
Turkestan and led an army cor
ps in WWI. After the Civil War he functioned as 
Regent, during WWII as Commander-in-Chief and 
finally President.
The Civil War was fought in the shadow of inter-
national politics. There were still 50,000–60,000 
Russian soldiers in the country. Whites (60,000) 
disarmed everybody within reach, whereas Reds 
(70,000), by contrast, welcomed thousands of 
volunteers. Their operative brain was a Russian 
colonel. Redʼs initial attacks were beaten back, 
where after Whites encircled opposing Reds at 
Tampere and forced them to capitulate. Simulta-
neously, a German division arrived in Hanko to 
thwart the build-up of a new front by the British 
along the Murmansk Railroad. In practice, Ger-
mans occupied Helsinki and interrupted the Red 
withdrawal to Carelia. They also neutralized the 
Russian navy in Helsinki, a task beyond White ca-
pabilities. These turned attention to the Isthmus 
and compelled Reds to capitulate. Lenin did not 
intervene. The struggle was over and camps full of 
Red prisoners, of which 15 percent died in hunger 
and diseases. Roughly 7,500 prisoners, 40 percent 
more than battle losses, were executed summar-
ily. Their memory poisoned human relations for 
decades. The urban population was starving be-
cause grain deliveries from Russia did not arrive 
and foreign trade was at a standstill.
Germans were popular among Whites. A disas-
trous trade agreement escaped notice by most. A 
German king appeared to guarantee a happy fu-
ture. But before he arrived, Germany had mutinied 
and sued for armistice. Finland had to change pol-
icy, and rapidly. Mannerheim was selected Regent, 
allies were begged for provisions, a republican Con-
stitution replaced the royalist one, and Germans 
were replaced by the British navy. It located at 
Koivisto and made daring raids against Kronstadt 
where Russians lost two major and several minor 
ships (Fig. 5). The raids were a real pas faux by 
Finland. It had got a new protector but was unable 
to control it. The bill would fall due later on. Rus-
sian civilians were expelled. But when Bolshevik 
terror in Petersburg intensified, many returned as 
refugees, Ilya Repin for example. The wealthy ones 
continued to France, Great Britain, and the USA; 
others did their best to stay. Some changed their 
family name. They and their talented and flexible 
children became a national asset.
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6  Dreams and reality
Independence intoxicated the winners. Man-
nerheim fantasized of liberating Petersburg from 
Bolsheviks and gaining conservative Russiaʼs 
gratitude. Responses to feelers sent out to that 
effect were entirely negative, however, and the 
rank-and-file of his army wanted to go home. Le-
nin moved the capital back to Moscow in 1918 and 
recalled: “Finns did not attack, Judenitsh (coming 
from Estonia) was defeated, and Revolution was 
saved.” Overblown self-confidence then took other 
forms. One wished to liberate Finns and Careli-
ans in Russia and, if possible, integrate their ter-
ritories with Finland, another to get access to the 
Arctic Sea either by annexing Petsamo or parts 
of Finmarken. Revolts in Ingria and East Carel-
ia were basically protests against enrollment into 
the Red Army and confiscation of farm products. 
Their Finnish support had nationalistic motives. 
The Finnish minority in northern Sweden was 
also observed, whereas Swedenʼs ambitions in 
Åland, supported by a unanimous population, 
were hotly contested.
In Ingria the Finnish goal was cultural autono-
my. The Finns counted 140,000, a third of the ru-
ral population, in 1917 and had a distinct identity, 
a situation similar to the surroundings of Helsinki 
where the Swedish population had cultural auton-
omy at the municipal level. Of course, the politi-
cal influence of Swedish speakers was something 
else than of Finns in the Soviet Union but that 
does not invalidate the principle. Although Sovi-
et dignity did not allow the acceptance of Finnish 
suggestion as such, it was partially implemented, 
until Stalinistic ideas replaced Leninistic ones. 
Ultimately, most Finns either perished or were 
dispersed during World War II. Thereby was lost 
an important lever for future friendly relations.
East Carelia, i.e., western parts of Olonets and 
Viena, was equally complicated. The Murmansk 
Railroad from Petersburg was a supply channel 
for Allies and strategically important. Its con-
struction had brought an influx of Russians, al-
though Carelians still constituted one-half of the 
total count 165,000 people, more in the north and 
less in the south. East Carelia had risen to Finnish 
consciousness when a provincial doctor, E. Lönn-
rot, had collected old runic verses there, compiled 
them into a book, Kalevala, and launched the 
idea that here were the remnants of an ancient 
Finnish culture. Similar material could have been 
collected among the Russian population too, but 
would have destroyed the myth. Such a province 
and people obviously needed liberation and now 
the opportunity had arrived. The government was 
lukewarm but young enthusiasts were unstoppa-
ble. They organized several expeditions in 1918–
22, got arms from sympathizers in the army, and 
some support from the local population, particu-
larly in the north, before the British and Bolshe-
viks chased them away. The region became an au-
tonomous Soviet republic, refugees from Finland 
constituted its highest social layer, with Finnish 
as the other administrative language. It exported 
boards, pulp, and paper. Allowed to keep a good 
share of earned currency, it prospered. During 
Stalinʼs industrialization it lost the privileges, the 
Finnish elite was purged as nationalists, artificial 
Carelian was introduced at schools, and Russian 
became the language of administration. 
Finlandʼs drive to the Arctic succeeded in Petsa-
mo, promised as compensation for a rifle factory at 
the Siestar River (Fig. 4). The Finns took the mat-
ter up at peace negotiations in 1920 and the Rus-
sians agreed to cede a wide corridor. A quay was 
built at Liinahamari, 530 km from Rovaniemi. 
Then nickel ore was discovered at Kolos River, a 
British–Canadian company opened a mine and 
the attached smelter became operational in 1942. 
After Norwayʼs occupation by Germany in 1940, 
Liinahamari became an outlet for Finland and 
Sweden. The situation in Finmarken was more 
diffuse. Norwegians had been there since the 
fourteenth century and Finns arrived in mass 
500 years later, to work in fisheries, forming the 
Kveenish community. Now Finnish nationalists 
also wanted to “liberate” them and catalyzed re-
pressive measures by Norwegians. The long NW 
“arm” of Finnish Lapland, 39 km from the Lyn-
genfjord, was a heritage of czarist policy.
Ålandʼs population had sent representatives to 
Stockholm in 1918 to ask for unification. Sweden 
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sent a naval unit which withdrew when the Ger-
man navy arrived. Locally, the archipelagoʼs lan-
guage and neutrality were the issues. Internation-
ally, the issue was the control of the northern Baltic. 
The dispute was left to the League of Nations in 
Geneva. They sided with Finland on condition that 
Åland was granted autonomy except during war 
when temporary occupation was allowed. In prac-
tice, the province is semi-independent with per-
manent lantdag, immigrant controls to preserve 
Swedishness, its own budget, flag, stamps and 
exemptions from the EUʼs tax legislation: a Grand 
Duchy in miniature. It has the best of both worlds.
The Soviet Union became a closed market but 
was rapidly replaced by Western ones. The wounds 
of the civil war gradually healed. The Labor move-
ment split into Social Democrats and Commu-
nists. The former started operating within months 
of the end of hostilities. The latter, perhaps 15–20 
percent of voters, were handled as traitors. The 
brawl between Finnish- and Swedish-speakers 
calmed down in the 1930s. Nationalists tried a 
coup in 1932 but were scolded by the President, 
the same man who had filed the application for 
independence, in a wireless speech and returned 
home puzzled. Nazi pageantry did not tally with 
the Finnish mentality and racially Finns were 
classified very low. Parliamentary support for the 
nationalists declined to 4 percent.
7  Greatest pride
Meanwhile, dark clouds were gathering in the 
international sky. Hitler was preparing for war 
and Stalin believed that he had ten years at his 
disposal. Hectic industrialization with an empha-
sis on metallurgy was started. The point of grav-
ity was transferred toward the Urals, beyond the 
range of enemy aviation. Harsh measures created 
resistance, suppressed by merciless terror. “The 
human price was very high,” admitted President 
V.V. Putin decades later. A large-scale purge of of-
ficers proved almost fatal.
Diplomatic activity followed suit. An unassum-
ing diplomat at the Russian embassy made con-
tact with the Finnish foreign minister in April 
1938. He pointed out how close (30 km) the in-
ternational border was to Leningrad – a familiar 
theme already in 1911. Wasnʼt it time to reorga-
nize? His talk lacked the conventional phrase-
ology and the minister informed his colleagues. 
Mannerheim was also contacted. An invitation 
to formal negotiations came in October 1939, few 
weeks after deals had been made with the Baltic 
countries. The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact had allo-
cated Finland to the Russian sphere of interest. 
The border on the western Isthmus should be 
moved so that the Koivisto anchorage, deepest (9 
m) in the eastern Gulf, would be in Soviet terri-
tory (Fig. 5). Part of the main defense line would 
thereby be lost. A threefold slice of East Carelia 
was offered as compensation. Finland should, in 
addition, rent Hanko for 50 years to be used as 
a naval base. Since the port was important for 
winter traffic, a nearby anchorage would also do. 
Both alternatives were rejected. On the Isthmus, 
Mannerheim suggested concessions, followed by 
new fortifications and rapid arming. Troops were 
mobilized and put to work. But the Great War had 
already started. Who would sell arms at short no-
tice? Stalin was genuinely amazed. He had offered 
a fair deal and these Chuhnas (derogatory word) 
refused to accept it. “It seems that soldiers must 
handle the matter then,” V.M. Molotov said to 
Finnish negotiators, who did not understand that 
time had ran out. But Stalin had also overlooked 
something: credibility. Finns suspected that new 
demands would follow at the next opportunity.
On paper, Finnish odds were poor and deterio-
rated rather than improved: 1:2 in infantry; 1:4 in 
artillery; 1:10 in airplanes; practically no tanks; 
far too little artillery ammunition. Inferiority in 
technology is a feature typical of a small country 
challenging a Great Power. Finns were also short 
of uniforms and had not trained all their manpower 
because Communists were considered unreliable. 
In practice, the Communists proved as patriotic as 
the rest. Many had relatives in the Soviet Union 
and were aware of their fate in the purges. The 
White Guards had 60,000 well-trained fighters and 
as many female auxiliaries (lotta). Transportable 
tents with portable stoves were an important as-
set. All could use skis. The Soviets lacked seasoned 
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officers, tents, could seldom ski, and training was 
for open terrain. Their clothing was adequate and 
weapons were excellent, however.
The attack came at the end of November simul-
taneously with threatening news: a democratic 
government had been formed “somewhere in Fin-
land” with Comrade Kuusinen as the prime minis-
ter. It welcomed the Red Army as liberators. East 
Carelia had recently been raised to the status of 
a Finnish–Carelian Soviet Republic and “now the 
time had arrived to make the old dream true by 
uniting the Finnish and Carelian people”. The 
perspective was truly sensational but was opened 
too late and lacked the backing of the Realpoli-
tik, for example how Srbs (Sorben) were treated 
in Germany, to be applicable in the case at hand. 
Most territorial gains were subsequently added to 
Soviet Carelia – but only for a short period. Finns 
saw such measures as a clumsy imposture. The 
Soviet air force strafed cities and rail traffic, but 
its army could not break through the main de-
fenses. Some quiet weeks followed, during which 
the Soviets brought more divisions and retrained 
their troops. Along the 1,000 km-long eastern bor-
der, they had two-to-three-times more divisions 
than anticipated. Finns encircled several of them 
and the legend of skiing forest fighters was born. 
But the Russians built field fortifications and 
maintained their fighting spirit even after –30 oC 
nights around open camp fires. Nor did they hes-
itate to wade over flooded ice like at Viipuri Bay. 
The booty from encirclements (motti) was formida-
ble and surpassed Swedish deliveries. Then Rus-
sian superiority began to count. Finns could not 
compensate for losses and troops never got rest. A 
Swedish volunteer corps was a drop in ocean. The 
French and British talked about military help but 
Sweden refused thoroughfare. The real goal was 
the iron ore mines between the Kalix and Luleå 
Rivers which supplied Germany. When the Sovi-
Figure 5 Border negotiations, Oct.-Nov.1939.
Legend: F = Finnish suggestion; R = Russian suggestion; K = Kronstadt. Ino, Krasnaya Gorka and Kronstadt fortifications. 
Ino without guns 1918-1944.
Source: Seppälä, Helge, 1969. Taistelu Leningradista ja Suomi . WSOY: Porvoo – Helsinki, 67.
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ets crossed the Viipuri Bay and cut off the coastal 
road to Helsinki, Finns sued for peace. The Sovi-
ets consented. They did not wish for confrontation 
with Western Allies. Peace was made on March 15 
at terms much worse than in negotiations: Peter 
Iʼs border, Hanko town, and Salla region. Petsamo 
was not mentioned – Norwegians should not be 
alarmed and the British–Canadian mines were 
there. Finland lost 20 percent of its industrial ca-
pacity and 400,00 people left their homes. Kuusin-
enʼs government was quietly shelved.
8  The Great War
Germans occupied Denmark and Norway from 
April 9, 1940, and the Low Countries from May 
10. The British withdrew to their islands and the 
French made armistice in June. The Soviet Union 
integrated the Baltic republics at the same time. 
What would have been Finlandʼs fate if peace 
had been delayed by three months? The same as 
Estoniaʼs, which ultimately lost one-fourth of its 
population? These time windows come and go. 
The Germans considered an invasion of England 
and launched air raids which peaked in August 
but could not defeat the British air force. The 
Soviets maintained pressure in Finland, vetoing 
unsuitable candidates in presidential elections 
and the Finnish–Swedish defense alliance, while 
requiring a majority participation in the Kolos 
River nickel complex. The Finns stalled at Kolos 
River and got secret support from Germany. It was 
the only nickel source within their reach. Troop 
movements beyond the border were observed and 
a Russian attack was expected on several occa-
sions. In August, the Germans indicated a will-
ingness to sell arms. The purchase was the first 
move from the Soviet to the German camp; the 
transit of German vacationers was the next one. 
The decisive event occurred in November. Molotov 
demanded that the Pact should also be respected 
in Finland but Hitler did not wish a new war in 
the north. Now Finland had a protector as in 1918 
and adapted foreign policy accordingly.
The transit of German vacationers was due to 
geography. Finmarken lacked land connection to 
the south and the British dominated the sea. Trav-
el through Finland was safer and speedier. That 
suited Finns: with Germans in, Soviets would stay 
out. Sweden agreed to similar traffic. Then the Ger-
mans wanted to exchange troops in Finmarken. 
More arrived but nobody left. The newcomers also 
seemed to prefer Finnish forest to Norwegian tun-
dra. Soviets were well informed. Some Finnish air-
fields were handed over. German naval units hid in 
the Finnish archipelago. There was no formal trea-
ty and the Finns wondered whether it was business 
or bluff, to conceal activity elsewhere. On June 22, 
the veil was raised. It was business and the Soviet 
air force raided Finnish territory. The German and 
Finnish navies closed exit from the Gulf of Finland. 
When raids continued, Finns declared themselves 
at war with the Soviet Union. The opportunity to 
regain lost territory was there. When guilt was 
debated after the war, Molotov accused: “You had 
Germans in the country.” Indeed, but there were 
Soviets also, at Hanko.
The Germans planned to reach the Volga River 
before the onset of winter and go then to winter 
quarters. It was an unrealistic idea considering 
that the opponents were Russians. There were 
three diverging wedges and distances were long 
for a single campaign. Much depended on the 
firmness of Soviet resistance. Finnish officers 
with experience of the country were skeptical. The 
main rule was that Finland should not participate 
in a direct attack against Leningrad. That was a 
quiet confession that the idea of ousting Bolshe-
viks from Petersburg in 1918 had been unsound. 
The C-in-C enjoyed unlimited authority and was 
given the right to conclude armistice without con-
sulting anybody. The Germans were prepared to 
subordinate their army in Finland under his com-
mand. Since that would have implied the C-in-Cʼs 
subordination to the German High Command, he 
declined. Finns conducted three consecutive oper-
ations in the south: a wedge between the Carelian 
Isthmus and Olonets, a dash to the old border op-
posite Leningrad, and another one along Ladogaʼs 
eastern coast to the Svir River.
The Germans advanced rapidly in the first 
weeks. Then centrifugal forces made themselves 
felt and movement slowed. They reached Neva 
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River at Oreshek in early September. Finns were 
at the old border 50 km north, facing Leningradʼs 
fortifications. They had infantry but lacked heavy 
artillery, perhaps intentionally. Their reluctance to 
continue was observed by the Soviets. In Olonets, 
they had reached the Svir. To get Finns to advance 
further, the Germans humored them by offering a 
border along the Neva. In vain. Frontal attack from 
the south was impossible with the forces available. 
Finally, the Germans tried to close the trap at the 
Svir in November but failed. Leningradʼs siege be-
gan (Fig. 6). It was the cradle of the October Rev-
olution and Leninʼs town. Surrender would have 
been disastrous for morale. Moreover, its defense 
neutralized 200,000 Germans and the key indus-
tries had been evacuated. The remaining civilians 
could be supplied somehow via Ladoga. Or could 
they? What might have happened if the old border 
had remained? The Soviets would have used Finn-
ish territory for evacuation and supplies, thereby 
catalyzing German countermeasures. Would Fin-
land have sided with the Soviet Union, possibly 
against territorial concessions?
Figure 6 Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1944.
Source: Seppälä, Helge, 1969. Taistelu Leningradista ja 
Suomi . WSOY: Porvoo – Helsinki, 180.
In East Carelia, Lake Onega was reached in 
early December (Fig. 7). All had agreed on the 
advance to the old border. Leftists wanted to stop 
there: East Carelia was not Finnish territory. 
Moderates considered it a buffer zone. Defense 
along the Svir, Onega, and White Sea coast would 
be easier. The richly mineralized Kola Peninsula 
was attractive. Also, the Germans and Norwegian 
nationalists wanted to participate. Defense on the 
White Sea was overlooked. Perhaps the German 
navy would take care of that. British interests 
were ignored. These came to day in Churchillʼs 
letter to the C-in-C which demanded an imme-
diate halt. This was forthcoming, but correspon-
dence with Germanyʼs enemy was out of the ques-
tion. Britain declared war. It shocked the political 
establishment but not the army in the Carelian 
forest. The land of runes and untamed nature was 
now Finnish – at least for the time being. Most 
of the population had been evacuated. Remaining 
Russians were put into camps, to wait transport to 
the east, and used in occasional jobs. Wages were 
differentiated: Finns 100, Carelians 70, Russians 
50. When Finnish hopes faded, they were equal-
ized. Camps were congested and food was poor, 
but with time mortality reached normal levels. 
Idealistic Finns worked hard to raise living stan-
dards but met little response since the population 
expected a Soviet return. Logically, it also escaped 
collective punishment after the war. A former ad-
ministrator published decades later a book titled 
The Land Which Did Not Exist.
In the north, the Germans wanted to cut off the 
Murmansk Railroad. Their troops were not suited 
for the task and the sparse roadnet made large 
concentrations impossible. The Finns came to help 
and the front started to move, but now the Ameri-
cans became alarmed. They considered the Soviet 
Union a smaller ill than Germany and wanted to 
keep supply lines open. At the end of October, a 
secret ultimatum was given: stop the advance or 
we will declare war. That helped. Troops could not 
understand. The Germans were furious but kept 
face. The railroad had a link at Belomorsk to the 
Archangel Railroad (Fig. 4). The Germans sug-
gested a joint operation against it in the spring 
of 1942. The Russians were well prepared and the 
Finns complained of a lack of forces. The idea was 
shelved. After the war, it was estimated that Arctic 
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ports handled only 10 percent of the traffic during 
the critical 1941–2 period. Rumors started circu-
lating about the harsh treatment of Estonians and 
people began to wonder about Finlandʼs fate after 
the “final victory”. In Finland, civil administra-
tion always remained with domestic authority.
Finland had over 0.5 million (16 percent) of its 
population in the armed forces. That could not be 
sustained and the eldest cohorts were released. 
The death toll was 25,000 and as many would be 
permanent invalids –  equivalent to three infantry 
divisions out of fifteen. Refugees were not yet fully 
settled. Food ratios were 60 percent of normal con-
sumption. German deliveries had not arrived be-
cause the Baltic was in thick ice up to the Danish 
sounds. A temporary famine was a fact. The Ger-
man invasion in Russia had been beaten back. 
The USA escorted convoys halfway over the Atlan-
tic. Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor which took 
some heat off Europe. This encouraged Hitler to 
declare war on the USA. Now President Roosevelt 
could set priorities: “Europe first.” The gamble 
had failed. Peace would be concluded with Stalin. 
It was important to maintain a low profile.
9  Endgame
The army spent time building fortifications, 
prefabricated houses, making wooden artifacts, 
arranging sporting contests, and studying by 
distance  classes; but not honing fighting skills. 
Equipment was becoming outdated and tactical 
developments were ignored. Many wished that 
peace would be made at friendly terms and that 
the 200,000 Germans in the north would go home 
freely. The main obstacle was that their industry 
got 75 percent of its nickel from Finland and also 
most of the molybden, used in the manufacture 
of synthetic gasoline. Mannerheim thought that 
there would be negotiations, with East Carelia 
as a barter object. The Soviets observed the de-
teriorating morale and decided to force Finland 
to peace before the endgame in Central Europe. 
Feelers had been sent out already in 1941 and this 
was repeated in 1944. Finnish negotiators even 
went to Moscow via Stockholm but the terms were 
too harsh. The Germans got wind of this play and 
discontinued essential deliveries for a time. The 
Russians tried to soften the Finns with air raids 
against Helsinki. But their air force was designed 
for cooperation with the army and not for strate-
gic bombing. The Finns were prepared and only 5 
percent of the bombs fell on the city.
When air raids failed, the Russians opted for 
a ground attack. They had revamped tactics and 
used massive artillery fire. The Germans had been 
pushed to the Narva–Pskov line and operational 
freedom was achieved (Fig. 6). There was a time 
window in June/July 1944. Two-thirds of the Finn-
ish army was in East Carelia, where fortifications 
were the best, a legacy of the Siege. Signs of forth-
coming attack were ignored. Had the C-in-C lost 
his grip? He was already 77 years old, plagued by 
stomach pains and nervous eruption in his hands. 
When the attack came, key commanders were on 
vacation, artillery horses loaned to farmers, new 
antitank weapons in the depot, and bureaucracy 
slowed the supply of ammunition. Some units col-
lapsed and spread panic during their flight. The 
Russians advanced to Viipuri in ten days, where 
water bodies and rocky terrain slowed movement. 
The German foreign minister arrived in Helsin-
ki ten days later demanding a formal treaty. The 
president signed a declaration that he would not 
stop fighting (the Ribbentrop Pact). It was a ploy, 
but more was not available. The USA had expelled 
the Finnish ambassador a few days earlier but did 
not declare war. Then countermeasures started to 
bite. The commanding structure was revamped. 
Reinforcements from East Carelia started to ar-
rive. Innovative artillery tactics did wonders. 
Help was asked for from the Germans. These 
sent materiel, a 70-plane dive bomber squadron, 
a tank brigade, and an infantry division. Valiant 
bomber crews destroyed 250 tanks out of the orig-
inal 800. The main battle raged for three weeks 
with 150,000 combatants involved. The Russians 
started withdrawing troops in early July. Their 
time window had closed. The Germans returned 
to Estonia. East Carelia was abandoned. Fighting 
slowed down. The Finnish Parliament selected the 
C-in-C as president. He had not given promises. 
Now he waited until the Germans had left Estonia 
Figure 7 Frontline 1941-1943.
Legend: P = Petsamo; S = Salla.
Source: Lappalainen, Matti, 1982. Kuinka jatkosota 
kestettiin sotilaallisesti. In: Olli Vehviläinen (toim.), Jatko-
sodan kujanjuoksu , 50-71. WSOY: Porvoo – Helsinki, 69.
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and then restarted sending out peace feelers.
The Russians did not request surrender as previ-
ously. President Rooseveltʼs stand in Tehran (1943) 
had helped. Swedenʼs sustained neutrality depend-
ed on developments in Finland. Occupation with 
an ensuing partisan war would need one million 
men to suppress, forces badly needed in Germa-
ny. Weapons were hidden all over the country for 
that possibility. When they were discovered after 
the war, the Russians did not react. Perhaps they 
had known. Other terms were broadly unchanged: 
expulsion of Germans, demobilization of army, 
1940 borders plus the loss of Petsamo, the lease 
of Porkkala peninsula instead of Hanko, war rep-
arations USD 300 million in six (later eight) years, 
and the trial of war criminals (Fig. 5). Mannerhe-
im was promised immunity. A shadow government 
of left-wing politicians in Stockholm was ignored. 
The army would never have respected their deal. 
Armistice came into force September 15. Formal 
peace would wait until the Allies had agreed upon 
overall terms. Porkkala was 25 km west of Helsinki 
and would become a naval base. Its largest guns 
reached Helsinki – tables had turned. Porkkala 
looked more dangerous than it actually was, and 
was returned to Finland without compensation in 
1955 when N.S. Chruschev tried to get the Amer-
icans to abandon their foreign bases. Reparations 
were in gold dollars, 600 million at current prices. 
That was a nasty surprise but in the wake of the 
Marshall Plan, the amount was lowered to USD 
450 million. The amount was still high but not 
overwhelming – 15 percent of GNP. War expens-
es had been 25 percent of GNP during the quiet 
years, against 55 percent by the main belligerents. 
When the 1944 anniversary of the October Revo-
lution arrived, the President sent congratulations 
to Generalissimus Stalin. He used French, the lan-
guage of diplomats and his domestic language in 
Petersburg, and signed: Mannerheim, Maréchal de 
Finlande, Baron. A chapter in the Finnish–Russian 
relationship was closed.
10  Best friends
Germans in the north had to withdraw to Fin-
marken. They evacuated civilians to Sweden and, 
to slow Finnish advance, destroyed bridges, mined 
roads, and burnt buildings. The Russians demand-
ed drastic measures from the Finns and were at 
times threatening. They had a Supervisory Com-
mission in Helsinki, headed by A.A. Zhdanov, the 
Leningrad party boss. Mannerheim was hospital-
ized and J.K. Paasikivi, the prime minister, took 
over. The immediate problem was how to feed the 
population. Granaries were empty, German deliv-
eries discontinued, and Swedish reserves eaten 
up. Stalin promised 59,000 tonnes, one-fourth of 
the German quota. It was not the first time. When 
Paasikivi returned home from Moscow at the end 
of May 1941, Stalin gave him 20,000 tonnes as a 
token of personal appreciation. The main inter-
est was in war reparations with an emphasis on 
machinery, ships, cables and prefabricated hous-
es. That necessitated much new capacity which 
might remain unused once the reparations were 
over. “Then we will buy all that you can produce,” 
was the reply. Good quality and timely deliveries 
created good will. It was the beginning of bilateral 
trade. The trial of war criminals became acrimoni-
ous. Political verdicts do not exist in Finland. The 
Soviets were adamant: “Either you sentence them 
or we will move the trial to Moscow.” U.K. Kek-
konen, then Justice Minister, bit the bullet and 
saw to it that each accused was sentenced, the top 
men to ten years with hard labor. In practice, they 
wrote memoires or were hospitalized and subse-
quently pardoned if seriously ill.
U.K. Kekkonen fought on the White side in the 
Civil War, worked as Secret Service agent, became 
Law Doctor, and was Minister of the Interior 
1937-9. A political “Hawk” until late 1943 when 
contacted Soviet and US representatives in 
Stockholm. Negotiated Porkkalaʼs return, enjoyed 
Sovietsʼ trust, advocated non-aligned foreign 
policy, and welcomed Communists as a junior 
partner to the government.
Formal peace was made in Paris in 1947. Within 
a year the former allies were in a heated quarrel. 
Stalin had created national party alliances that 
he controlled. The USA offered economic help (the 
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Marshall Plan) and launched NATO. The Soviet 
Union responded with the Warsaw Pact. Finland 
guarded the northern approaches of Leningrad. 
Inclusion in the Warsaw Pact would rock the boat 
but what about a defense pact (Friendship Trea-
ty)? An invitation to Moscow arrived in 1948. Kek-
konen led the delegation, with Paasikivi at home 
as the final arbiter. It was clear that a pact would 
be concluded. Discussions were about content and 
wording. These were favorable for Finland. Its 
wish to stay outside international conflicts was 
mentioned. Did it mean neutrality? A decade later, 
Finns started making hints to that effect, whereas 
Russians emphasized a de facto alliance. Argu-
mentation ended only at the Soviet Unionʼs disin-
tegration. If invasion by (Federal) Germany or its 
allies threatened, negotiations would be started 
on how to counter it. But who decided the threatʼs 
existence? Both sides would help the other to beat 
the invasion back. The idea was by no means new. 
Mannerheim had suggested it to Zhdanov in 1945, 
just to preserve the army. This had declined, per-
haps unwisely. Now the Soviets themselves sug-
gested joint exercises and their high brass came 
repeatedly to them. The Finns avoided even dis-
cussions but purchased war material which was 
both inexpensive and of high quality. It was also 
agreed that Finnish commanders could attend 
classes at the Frunze Academy, the highest officer 
school. That gave insight to Russian thinking and 
has continued to this day.
Kekkonen was both Paasikiviʼs and the Rus-
siansʼ favorite for presidency. In 1940, the Rus-
sians had vetoed assumed antagonists. Now 
they promoted one candidate and discriminated 
against select parties, showing displeasure very 
clearly: their ambassador was called home and no 
replacement arrived, trade negotiators were all 
on vacation, Federal Germanyʼs foreign policy ne-
cessitated consultations. Kekkonen stayed presi-
dent for 25 years, when one term was six years. 
That was much resented but also had a positive 
side. Russians appreciate political stability and 
quiet diplomacy. Get their trust and many things 
become possible. Kekkonenʼs “best friend” was 
Chruschev, with whom he took steam baths, along 
with A.N. Kosygin, the economy czar during the 
Brezhnev era, with whom he wandered over the 
Caucasus. During the war, both had organized 
evacuations, Kekkonen from Carelia and Kosygin 
from Leningrad. Many construction projects re-
sulted from their discussions.
The Soviets operated in several sectors. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs took care of formali-
ties, with skill and courtesy. The Communist Par-
ty kept contact with its namesake and, gradually, 
other parties as well. It set political goals and kept 
control of the purse strings. Several administra-
tions gathered intelligence. If an ambassador was 
a party man, the host country belonged to the 
Socialist camp. If he came from the Foreign Min-
istry, the country was Capitalistic. In the 1980s, 
Finland belonged in the former group. A trusted 
contact among the Soviets intermediated messag-
es to the correct persons and returned responses 
rapidly and fairly reliably. He may have been the 
closest equivalent of a “Resident,” as used by the 
British in India. The trick was to know to whom he 
reported and their rank in the pecking order. The 
contact was frequently fluent in Finnish whereas 
Finns used interpretation. This was also Kek-
konenʼs shortcoming. He was often invited to Za-
vidovo, the Central Committeeʼs hunting ground 
close to Moscow. Photos reveal that he was a bit 
of a silent outsider. Routine could still be han-
dled in Leningrad. During Chruschevʼs and Bul-
ganinʼs visit in 1957, the locomotive upon which 
Lenin had escaped adversaries in the summer of 
1918 was given as a gift. It had previously been 
forgotten at a railroad depot. The Finns also shot 
a movie, “Trust”, in recognition of Finlandʼs inde-
pendence. It was no money-spinner but that was 
unimportant. The goal was political. In Russian 
culture, a heritage from Mongols and ultimately 
possibly the Chinese, a highly placed person can 
do no wrong. If Lenin and Stalin had together 
given Finland independence, nobody could take it 
away. End of story. The relations became so cor-
dial that jealous neighbors introduced a new polit-
ical term: Finnlandisierung.
Trade was bilateral at world market prices, if any 
existed. Soviet five-year plans provided the frame-
work, and details were agreed annually. Clearing 
accounts at central banks were also balanced an-
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nually. Credit risk did not exist and payments were 
timely. Complacent Finns neglected product devel-
opment. When the system collapsed in 1991, many 
export products to the Soviets were uncompetitive 
in the West. Finns desired energy carriers, grain 
and raw materials, but avoided cars, trucks, and 
machinery that were often outdated. The Soviets 
asked for machinery, ice-breakers, other ships, 
paper, and consumer articles for Leningrad. Kek-
konen succeeded in selling construction projects, at 
Norilsk Nickel among others, and agreed to buy a 
steel mill and a nuclear power plant. The Soviets 
also got embargo products. Finns had for a while a 
quasi-monopoly in Soviet phone exchanges. These 
contained US components and the Soviets suspect-
ed that there might be a secret switch to deacti-
vate the gadgets. It took years to convince them 
that there was none. Then it took time to convince 
Americans that they now got reliable information 
about the pace of renovation of the Soviet commu-
nication network.
Kekkonenʼs last services to his country were 
the Helsinki Security Conference in 1975 and the 
abolition of customs duties with the EEC in 1977. 
The Conference may have been Kekkonenʼs idea, 
to strengthen the image of non-allied Finland, but 
was readily accepted by Soviets who saw in it a 
possibility to consolidate their influence in Eastern 
Europe. The passage about freedom of speech was 
insisted on by Western countries because it made 
the suppression of unorthodox opinion more diffi-
cult. The EEC deal had both economic and political 
dimensions. Duties were crucial for exports because 
most markets were in Europe. The Russians admit-
ted it. They were suspicious about political conse-
quences. Kekkonen put his authority into play: He 
would personally guarantee an unchanged political 
line. Ultimately, the Soviets were right. The EEC 
became the European Union, Finland entered it in 
1995, but Russia was kept out.
11  Conciliation
Kekkonen and Brezhnev left the scene almost 
simultaneously. Both countries desired a political 
thaw. In the Soviet Union, this meant Gorbat-
shevʼs perestroika, followed by imperial disinte-
gration during Yeltsinʼs reign and Putinʼs guid-
ed democracy thereafter. In Finland, it meant a 
return to normal parliamentary practice, disem-
powerment of the president, and an end of the 
Friendship Treaty. Economically, it meant the end 
of bilateral foreign trade. During the attached 
economic disorder it was Finlandʼs turn to supply 
Petersburg with 200,000 tonnes of grain and oth-
er foodstuffs. The clearing balance was heavily in 
Finlandʼs favor and many doubted that one would 
ever see the money. Nothing of the kind. Russia 
paid in full and much sooner than promised. Fin-
land was no longer alone in the club of countries 
who pay their debts.
Russiaʼs behavior in general became concilia-
tory. B.N. Yeltsin apologized for the meddling in 
Finlandʼs internal affairs, Putin laid a wreath on 
Mannerheimʼs grave, and both parties started 
raising memorials to war heroes in each otherʼs 
territory. It was quite incredible and opened doors 
that had been closed for decades. Carelian societ-
ies naturally started agitating for border adjust-
ment on the Isthmus. Once it happened during a 
live TV program with President Putin attending. 
He had difficulty controlling himself: “Borders 
are defined in the Peace Treaty and will remain 
as they are.” Applicants apparently thought that 
a humble request would do the thing. Kekkonen 
had received a corresponding answer in the 1960s 
when he tried to swap the Viipuri area against 
a vast tract in Lapland. His next try was a long-
term lease of the Saimaa Canal, taken into traffic 
in 1856 but unused since 1940. The Russians con-
sented but leased so little land that nothing could 
be built alongside. Later on, the return of Viipuri 
with surroundings was the political currency for 
the DDRʼs eventual recognition.
The Isthmus had been used by the military for 
training, but Putin had economic ideas: the oil 
terminal at Primorsk (Koivisto) with attached 
oil refinery and a dry bulk terminal at Ust Luga, 
Ingria. Petersburgʼs own port is comparatively 
shallow and cannot be extended because of the 
surrounding city. Pending Ust Lugaʼs completion, 
container cargoes with attached land transports 
have been handled by Finnish ports, Kotka in 
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particular. When one-fourth of Hamburgʼs outgo-
ing containers are destined for Petersburg, which 
handles about one-half of Russiaʼs imports, the 
logistical challenge becomes understandable. It is 
expected that Finnish ports will also have a role to 
play in clearing traffic peaks when Ust Luga has 
become fully operational.
Holiday houses are spreading along the coast 
as before the Revolution. A small cluster is also 
emerging north-east of Lappeenranta, Finland. 
Owners arrive by car from nearby industrial 
towns, Viipuri and even Moscow: wealthy, courte-
ous people. Real estate prices have risen substan-
tially to the great delight of sellers who now can 
emigrate to Thailand or some other “in” location. 
Few bother about long-term effects, encountered 
in the turn-of-the-century Isthmus vacation zone 
and ignore Russiaʼs declaration that all ethnic 
Russians living abroad enjoy its protection. Of 
course they do, but the phraseology is from co-
lonial times. Finlandʼs foreign minister advised: 
“We must balance things by buying real estate 
in Russia. Why donʼt you guys make a try?” It 
was not so simple in practice. There was no cot-
tage market. Occasional available lots had not 
been surveyed and Land Books, if they existed, 
were apparently in disorder. Russians have sub-
sequently decided that foreigners cannot own 
land in Russia. The sharp end is pointed towards 
Asia but the effect is felt overall. Danes also have 
a cottage-buyer dilemma on Jutlandʼs west coast 
which swarms with German guests. But Danes 
are shrewd. There is a law that allows foreign 
ownership only if a long-term tie with Denmark 
can be proved. What does the tie look like? There 
are no written rules; it all depends on administra-
tive judgment. “Would ten years of vacationing, 
a half-term university job, citizenship in another 
Nordic country and knowledge of the language be 
sufficient?” ”Impossible to say but do send an ap-
plication. Weʼll be happy to look at it.”
The southwestern archipelago is still an un-
derused vacation asset, well suited for the upscale 
market. One could develop the tradition of Lang-
inkoski further. The state could construct a ro-
mantic “wholesaler villa” with a sauna and moor-
ing for a large yacht, place it at the disposal of the 
Russian president during his period in office, and 
invite the inhabitants for dinner or afternoon tea 
to the Finnish presidentʼs summer residence near 
Turku, a relaxed surrounding for informal discus-
sions. The environmental future of the northern 
Baltic would certainly get the best possible atten-
tion, as a byproduct. 
Russian tourism exceeds one million nights, by 
some margin the dominant ethnic group. Peters-
burg with 75 percent is the largest city of origin 
for these visitors, followed by Moscow with 10 per-
cent. Some visitors come from Siberia, to see Hel-
sinki with its Russian history, the Saimaa Lake 
District, possibly the southwestern archipelago, to 
shop at Stockmannʼs which has answered in kind 
by building a fairly large store in Petersburg and 
smaller units in Moscow and Ekaterinburg. Finn-
ish grain products have one-third of Petersburgʼs 
and one-tenth of Moscowʼs market. But curiously, 
attempts to offer the supporting linguistic skills in 
primary education have been repeatedly thwarted 
at the national level. There still appears to be two 
Finlands, West and East. Helsinki and Petersburg 
are connected by “high-speed” trains: with formal-
ities on the train and a travel time of 3.5 hours. 
Russians have suggested the abolition of visas but 
Finns are ambivalent. The EU experience has not 
been entirely positive.
Military questions have not disappeared. There 
was a lull when things seemed to have settled 
down, when NATO and the Soviet Union agreed 
on a reduced military presence in Europe. Both 
sent troops home and East Europeʼs de facto occu-
pation ended. Then, NATO expanded to the Sovi-
etʼs old boundary and the missile shield was part 
of it. A Polish journal named it “Achillesʼ shield,” 
an allegory to the Greek Achilles who was immor-
tal except at his heel. The Soviets were explicit: 
“The first target will be the radar bases. Ballistic 
missiles with nuclear heads will be used.” The Eu-
ropean Union might have been a balancing factor 
but lost credibility in lax budgetary controls and 
mutual bickering. Finlandʼs allegiance in this new 
world naturally resurfaced: NATO or Russia? Dis-
tant or close friend? Kekkonen had opted for the 
close one, as do the great majority of Finns. Rus-
siaʼs main interest seems to be an early warning 
24 Risto Laulajainen
system in western Finland – run by Finns, if so 
agreed. In all likelihood, it would become a Finn-
ish variant of the Achillesʼ heel. Generals plan 
against a surprise attack by airborne troops with 
ensuing occupation of the country. Armaments at 
their disposal are of mixed origin, although NATO 
dominates the critical air defense. But is NATO a 
realistic option? How did it help Georgia (admit-
tedly a non-member) when they challenged Rus-
siaʼs territorial interests? Below the military level 
is the political plateau. NATO (read: “USA”) and 
Russia currently lock horns on several issues. But 
they can also agree about spheres of interest in 
the way the Soviet Union and Germany did in Au-
gust 1939. Would Finland still remain unaligned?
12  Conclusion
Finlandʼs rise from among “unassorted” Swed-
ish counties to an independent state over the past 
200 years has many layers and Sankt Petersburg 
has played a role in most of them. There is the 
military layer and its corollary, the location of the 
border. Then there is the administrative layer, 
best reflected in the status of Grand Duchy. The 
ethnic layer made itself felt comparatively late 
but has in reality underscored everything else. It 
splits into popular or grassroots culture and the 
refined variant.
The military layer remained for a long time 
unchanged. Its first manifestation was Peter Iʼs 
border and, had Sweden accepted it, that may 
well have been the end of the story. But Sweden 
looked for a revanche and ultimately lost all ter-
ritory east of the Gulf of Bothnia. That meant a 
radical extension of Petersburgʼs formal security 
zone, needing more troops and fortifications. An 
aggressor could choose between the two coasts 
of the Gulf of Finland and numerous ports. The 
southern alternative implied longer marshes with 
an unprotected right flank but ended closer to the 
city center. The northern alternative meant poor, 
hilly roads, a crossing of the Kymi River (later also 
the Saimaa Canal) and a break-through at the 
Viipuri narrows. This made a landing at Koivisto 
worth considering. It could best be prevented by 
closing the entry to the Gulf of Finland by forti-
fications at the Tallinn–Helsinki level. This was 
what Russia tried to do 1830–1960. Long-range 
bomber fleets and missiles have changed the equa-
tion. Their shortest route from the Norwegian Sea 
to the Russian heartland goes over Finnish ter-
ritory. It became important to get more depth to 
the defense, which means radar stations and air 
bases along the Bothnian coast. That is the core of 
the attempted joint defense policy. From a wider 
perspective, closeness to some border – or ocean 
shore – has lost much relevance in our time. There 
is no such thing as absolute security any longer. 
A rational solution is to disperse truly sensitive 
functions. Enhanced survival chances is one rea-
son why Swedes and Finns have decentralized 
core societal functions among second-tier urban 
centers. It is only shrouded in the guise of bal-
anced growth.
Finlandʼs status as a Grand Duchy in the 
Russian Empire reflected two things: Swedenʼs 
administrative superiority and the need to orga-
nize the newly acquired territories rapidly. The 
best testimony to Swedenʼs administrative excel-
lence was Peter Iʼs desire to adopt the Swedish 
law as such in his own country. That could not be 
done, however. The existing structures and ways 
of thinking were too different. Agreed, the idea 
to adopt a complete law, lock, stock, and barrel, 
was not entirely utopian. The current Commer-
cial Law in Russia is a rather exact copy of the 
Dutch one. Why Dutch? Because it happened to 
be the most recent one when adopted (Yeltsin re-
gime). But the Swedish legal system as a whole 
rose from the social fabric itself. The King could 
not make laws or raise taxes without the consent 
of the four parliamentary Estates. Peasants were 
one of them and often joined the King against the 
rest. Peasant representatives also sat on rural 
courts and could overrule the professional judge 
when unanimous. Farmhands, the lowest social 
layer, normally shared meals and lodging with 
the peasant family and could change employer 
after the harvest. This kept the social distance 
bearable. The homestead was actually a remnant 
of the old, egalitarian, Viking society which had 
survived in Europeʼs agricultural margin such as 
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in Norway and Sweden – but not in Denmark. The 
modern, individualistic society was built upon this 
fundament.
There were two ethnic spaces: between aborig-
inals and Russians, and between Swedish and 
Finnish speakers. The first space remained mar-
ginal up to the last decades of cohabitation because 
the shares of permanent inhabitants remained so 
small, 2–3 percent in both directions Finland/Pe-
tersburg, their closeness notwithstanding. There-
upon come as many Finns who emigrated beyond 
St. Petersburg. The discrimination against Rus-
sian migrants in Finland naturally contributed, 
but Petersburgʼs existence as an intervening op-
portunity for Russians and the barrier effect of 
Cyrillic versus Latin alphabet in both directions 
should also be acknowledged.
The Swedish–Finnish dimension became im-
portant with the availability of primary education. 
It has been speculated as to whether the Russian 
conquest really released the Finnish language 
from the shackles of Swedish, or whether it would 
have been reduced to an ethnographic curiosity in 
the way the Irish language has been in Eire. Both 
alternatives existed. But the adoption of English 
by most Irish people has not made them British, 
due to ethnic discrimination and the controver-
sy between the Roman Catholic versus Anglican 
and Presbyterian churches. Instead, they have 
been thoroughly integrated into the worldwide 
community of native English speakers with the 
attached competitive advantage. The adoption of 
Swedish as the only national language would have 
integrated the Finnish element properly into the 
Scandinavian mainstream. Whether that would 
have been beneficial or harmful is beyond this au-
thorʼs judgment.
Elements of common Finnish-Russian ethnici-
ty are natural considering the 1,000-year neigh-
borhood. Reference has been made to the genetic 
liaison. Conspicuous is the popularity of melan-
cholic minor tones (molli) in music played at in-
land dance parlors or the reworded romances of 
Russian Gypsies. This is in sharp contrast to the 
cheerful major modes (duuri) prevalent at the 
dance halls of the Swedish coastland. Finnish and 
Russian peasants love their bath houses (sauna), 
indispensable during periods of dirty and heavy 
agricultural work, but rare in Swedish regions. At 
the refined end of culture, the world-class educa-
tional facilities and estrades of performing arts in 
Petersburg have not received the recognition they 
deserve. Pre-independence Finnish painters and 
sculptors normally went to France and Italy, and 
Sibeliusʼ music was distributed in Europe by Ger-
man publishing houses. Post-World War II Helsin-
ki residents could regularly enjoy artistic pearls 
from the Maria/Kirov and Bolshoi Theaters, per-
formances available at the New York Metropolitan 
only sporadically.
Petersburgʼs nearness has undoubtedly added 
heat to diplomatic intercourse and been the ori-
gin of many wars. But it has also had a civilizing 
effect on this savage group of forest dwellers and 
marsh drainers, and a cradle of cultural impulses. 
It has been a gateway to another world, a world 
different from the familiar one. All one needs to do 
is to make a 180o turn, away from the setting sun, 
and look toward the rising one.
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